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Book Reviews
By Robert G. McCloskey.t
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. x, 376.
THE MODERN SUPREME COURT.

$3.95.
Robert McCloskey devoted much of his professional life to attempting the intellectual and moral resolution of his own libertarian impulses with his view of the proper role of the Supreme Court in a
democratic society. In a lifetime that spanned the judicial activism of
the "substantive due process" era and the judicial activism protecting civil liberties, he lived at an appropriate time for such an adventure.
Indeed, the attempt to reconcile the lessons learned from the earlier
period of activism with the impulses present in the later period ought
to be a healthy exercise for anyone seriously concerned with the values
of democratic processes and the furtherance of individual liberty. That
it was, indeed, a healthy exercise for McCloskey is not to say that his
attempt was wholly successful. It did, however, result in some perspectives, some helpful distinctions, and ultimately in some relevant
standards of evaluation of the judicial performance from a political
scientist's viewpoint, if not from a lawyer's.
What is the Modern Supreme Court? Writing in 1958, McCloskey
defined his "modern" Court as that Court which had sat since the
mid-1930's and responded in varying, but significant, degrees to the
major premises of a "new jurisprudence . . . reduced concern for

protecting economic rights, increased concern for protecting the other
rights of individuals, and acceptance of the idea of judicial selfrestraint."' Later, for reasons that are perhaps obvious from the subsequent activity of the Court in the 1960's, McCloskey's emphasis
shifted unmistakably to the second of these premises and away from
any tendency to self-restraint in the civil liberties area-"the judicial
impulse to expand civil rights." 2 Measured by this standard, and from
the perspective of our own time, the conclusion seems inescapable
that this "modern court" is the Warren Court, for it is that Court that
t Jonathan Trumball Professor of American History and Government, Harvard University (now deceased).
1. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 192 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McCLOSKEY].
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to a degree radically and dramatically greater than any of its predeces'3
sors evinced a "propensity to intervene in the governing process,
that demonstrated "a greater willingness to intervene in any major
' 4
policy question that affects personal freedom.
Thus, despite the broad title and the fact that the first two of the
four substantive chapters are devoted to the Stone and Vinson Courts,
this is indeed a book about the Warren Court. It is in the articles about
the Warren Court-all of them previously published and apparently
not significantly revised for inclusion here-that the interesting aspects
of McCloskey's dilemma are raised and wrestled with. The Stone and
Vinson chapters, written subsequently and especially to round out
this volume, are relatively pedestrian historical background and perspective.
The change in the major premises emphasized by McCloskey from
his 1958 article to the book's last article, originally published in 1965,
is no doubt reflective of a perhaps unperceived change in McCloskey's
own attitudes and assumptions about the Court's proper role. It is a
subtle change in assumptions, or expectations, that must have been
shared. by many observers of the Warren Court. It is an interesting
phenomenon in the psychology of the law that each new surpriseeach entry by the Court into a new area of the governing processtends to make the older surprises appear more appropriate and less
unique, regardless of whether or not their constitutional or other legal
rationale was originally persuasive. Thus, for example, Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.,5 may initially be perceived as the fabrication of a statute,
but the. next year it has become precedent, and perhaps someday we
will even be persuaded by its process of construction.
It is, of course, important to note that we may be as surprised at the
Court's assumption of legitimate power (given the doctrine of judicial
review) as we are by some of its more questionable assumptions of
governing power. The element of surprise is not necessarily any lack
of articulate legal rationale. In fact, for most of the non-lawyer public,
the legal rationale is probably a negligible factor in its evaluation of
the Supreme Court's performance. Perhaps the lack of successful congressional, executive, or other public citizen attempts to curb the Court,
and its acceleration of its own role despite such attempts, indicates
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 338.
Id. at 10.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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that the Court's actions over the past two decades are not so inappropriate or so far divorced from the traditional role of the Court in
America's decision-making. McCloskey suggests that, although the
Warren Court was the most activist Court in our history, the areas for
its activity made it more appropriatelyactivist than the activist Courts
7
that gave us Scott v. Sanford,8 or Lochner v. New York.
There is also a suggestion in McCloskey's works that the Court itself
was subject to the phenomenon of becoming accustomed to itselfthat this was almost a necessary ingredient of the Modem Court becoming modem. He describes the moderately liberal performance of
the Stone Court, and emphasizes the stops and starts of the Vinson
Court in building on this foundation-the lack of confidence in its
role or in the major libertarian premise that for McCloskey defined the
Modem Court. The first article on the Warren Court analyzes the
1955 Term and is called The Supreme Court Finds a Role. Toward
the end of the book, he summarizes the Warren Court as one that
"appears to have succeeded impressively in freeing itself from the selfdoubts that deterred constitutional development during the 1940-1953
period. With a zeal that seems to have increased as the years went by,
the justices have advanced boldly along the civil rights front." s
It is an interesting idea that the performance of the Warren Court
is a function of an increasing confidence to govern. A corollary must
be a developing confidence that the thrust of the libertarian decisions
is correct, and perhaps a growing confidence, or assumption, of the
simplicity of knowing the "right" decisions to the problems represented
in the cases before the Court. Such growing confidence might well lead
not only to an increased willingness to intervene in governance, but
also to an impatience with the need for rational doctrines that concerns
McCloskey throughout his analysis.
Although this concern for rationale persists to the end, the last two
articles seem to increase the emphasis on the limits and potentialities
of judicial power and the maintenance of the Court's role in the
governing process by its exercise of discretion and perhaps some of
the "passive virtues." 9 Thus, the focus is shifted, especially in the last
6. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
8. McCLOsKEY, supra note 1, at 341-42.
9. Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HAMv.
L. REv. 40 (1961).
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article entitled Reflections on the Warren Court, from the question
whether the Court should "play its modem elevated governmental
role" to the question whether as a practical matter it can play it-the
question of "judicial capability."' 10 "Does the Supreme Court have
enough [political] power to play its modern self-assigned role as a
major initiative-supplying agency of modem government?"", The
answer McCloskey gave was a guarded "yes."
It is worth noting that McCloskey, as a political scientist and citizenobserver, has a perception that is not necessarily of daily concern to a
practicing constitutional lawyer. The lawyer is less interested in the
"appropriateness" of the Court's assumption of governing powers than
he is in working with constitutional precedents and principles. The
two, of course, are closely intertwined and both are relevant to such
litigation. By the same token, however, the constitutional lawyer may
furnish some institutional perspectives on the role of the Court that
McCloskey, the political scientist somewhat surprisingly largely ignored
or underplayed: the limitations on the Court by virtue of its functions
as a "court of law," and the implications that the democratic process
has for establishing the appropriate role of the judiciary.
Certainly, the Supreme Court is more than a mere court of law. With
some of the same effect as Congress or the Executive, the Court does
set forth the "law of the land" as it decides cases involving individual
litigants. It does and must take policy considerations and constitutional
"values" into account. But under the function defined by article III,
its nature as a court of law has to be a major factor in defining the
nature of the Supreme Court's role in our governing process. It is,
however, a factor that McCloskey does not expressly articulate on anything close to a par with the other factors in his analysis.
The implication of the democratic process in determining the proper
role of the Court begins with the question why the Supreme Court is
limited by its role as a "law-finding" judicial agency. One significant
answer, aside from article III itself, is that the Court is not a part of
the majoritarian political process. There are reasons for appointing
judges and for giving them lifetime tenure. It is not so they can legislate some judicial idea of policy, but rather so that they can have the
independence from the majoritarian democratic political process that
10. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 1,at 325, 366.
11. Id. at 353.
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will help to assure both their power and their disposition to decide
cases rationally and according to law, and to protect certain "minoritarian" values that are presumably set out in the Constitution.
There are two major dangers in an activism not persuasively tied
to constitutional analysis. One is the institutional policy that caused
men like Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter to oppose the substantive
due process of the early 20th century-the nonrepresentative Court
was upsetting the people's will in major policy making areas. The
second danger-and one that bothered McCloskey as he feared the
Court might be reaching beyond its de facto political power-is the
risk of losing the Court's power in protecting minoritarian values because of an acceptance of governance opportunities constitutionally
assigned to the majoritarian political process.
These two limitations-of the law court role and the democratic
process-are basic to any analysis of the Supreme Court's proper function. Indeed, McCloskey does not ignore all of the issues that would
be covered under these headings. But in the overall book, explicit
recognition of these factors seems strangely under-articulated.
The most popular current question, of course, is what the Burger
Court will do to the "modem" Court concept. The present record is
mixed. But it may be no more mixed than that of the early Warren
Court, as described by McCloskey.' 2 In 1958, after five terms of the
Warren Court, McCloskey was still listing judicial self-restraint as one
of the major premises of the "modem" Court. 13
It is clear that the Burger Court has willingly intervened in the
governing process in favor of individual rights in major ways. The
following examples of Burger Court activism had the concurrence of at
least a majority of the Nixon appointees to the Court. The Court made
alienage a suspect classification under the equal protection clause in
striking down state statutes discriminating on that basis in granting
welfare benefits,1 4 admission to the bar,'5 and state civil service employment, 6 and came close to placing sex discrimination on the same
basis, holding unconstitutional laws giving men preference over women
in appointment as administrators of estates, 17 and granting military
12. Id. at 221-22.
13. Id. at 192.
14. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (unanimous decision; Justices Powell
& Rehnquist were not yet on the Court).
15. In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973) (Burger & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
16. Sugarman v. Dougall. 93 S. Ct. 2861 (1973) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
17. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (unanimous decision; Justices Powell & Rehnquist were not yet on Court).
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dependency benefits to servicewomen on a different basis than to
servicemen.' Busing and affirmative action to disestablish racial
school segregation were held to be constitutionally required. 19 Discrimination against dependent, unacknowledged illegitimate children
in a state workmen's compensation law was held to violate the equal
protection clause, 20 and the Court reaffirmed the principles of the
Warren Court's decision in Levy v. Louisiana.21 Wisconsin's compulsory education law was constitutionally required to yield to the
religious convictions of Amish who wanted to cut short their children's
schooling.22 Last, but certainly not least, the Burger Court intervened
to decide that a state's policy of protecting an unborn fetus' "potentian
ality for life" must yield to a woman's right to decide not to bear
23
already conceived child during the first trimester of pregnancy.
While there are other decisions in which the new Court has seemed
to backtrack or to decline to extend the Warren Court doctrines, it
seems clear that the new justices are not without confidence in their
own ability to govern and to protect what they conceive to be individual or civil rights. As McCloskey said in reference to the Vinson
Court, the "modern" Court "has been substantially unanimous in its
high regard for the values of what has here been called 'humane
democracy.' "24 Perhaps the Burger Court has acquired enough confidence from the example of its predecessor to carry out the libertarian
impulse.
Indeed, the ultimate proof of the Warren Court's uniqueness as an
activist "modern" Court may be the fact that its example and "tradition" have made the Nixon Court more activist than any Court at
least prior to President Eisenhower's appointment of a Chief Justice.
Merle W. Loper*
18. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Powell, Burger & Blackmun, JJ., concurring but declining to reach the issue whether sex is a suspect classification; Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. Keyes v. School Dist., 93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting); North Carolina
State Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (unanimous decision; Justices Powell &
Rehnquist were not yet on the Court); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402
U.S. 1 (1971) (unanimous; Justices Powell & Rehnquist were not yet on the Court).
20. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
21. 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (Harlan, Black, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
22. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Justices Powell & Rehnquist were not yet on
the Court).
23. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
24. McCLosKEY, supra note 1, at 153.
* B.A., Northwestern University, 1962; J.D., University of Chicago, 1965; Associate
Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.
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RECORDS,

COMPUTERS,

AND

THE

RIGHTS

OF CITIZENS.

Washington: United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973. Pp. xxxv, 346. $2.35.
In a 1971 survey' conducted by Time magazine and the American
Federation of Information Processing Societies, Inc., major concern
was expressed in respect of the use (and potential for abuse) of massive computerized information files. Of the audience surveyed (1,001
adults eighteen years of age and older), 63 per cent agreed with the
statement that development of large computerized information files
would help make government more effective, while simultaneously
concluding that "because of computerized information files, too many
people have information about other people" (58 per cent) and that
such massive information storage and retrieval systems ".

.

. may be

used to destroy individual freedom. ' 2 A significant number of the
survey universe expressed concern about information being kept (62
per cent).3 Approximately the same number of persons further concluded that the government is concerned about regulating the use of
4
computers for information retrieval.
The fact of the government's concern was demonstrated in the same
year by then Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Elliot L.
Richardson, who established an Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems (Advisory Committee). The Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. Willis H. Ware, Corporate Research Staff of
The Rand Corporation, issued its report this summer. The report,
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, deals in a generally
concise and forthright manner with the potential harm that might
result from the uncontrolled application by public and private organizations of evolving computerized information retrieval technology to
the collection, storage and use of data about individual citizens.
Former Attorney General Richardson, in accepting the report, acknowledged the Survey's expressed concern about ever-expanding computer technology for record-keeping about people:
We must learn to temper this particular technological application
1. AFIPS-Time, A National Survey of the Public's Attitudes Toward Computers, New
York: Time, Inc. (monograph undated).
2. Id. at Table 23.
3. Id. at Table 27.
4. Id. at Table 30.
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for due process and the average citizen's
with sensitive concern
5
wish to be let alone.
The significant minimum principles which the Advisory Committee
concluded are necessary to effectively control automated personal information data systems are five:
First.No personal data record-keeping system, the existence of which
is secret, can be permitted to be established.
Second. Every individual must have the right to review the data
about himself in the automated record-keeping system and to determine the manner in which such data is being used.
Third. Every automated data record-keeping system must provide a
means by which an individual can prevent information about himself
consensually obtained for one purpose from being used for any other
purpose without his prior consent.
Fourth. Any such system must provide the individual with a means
expeditiously to correct or amend the record of identifiable information about himself.
Fifth. The responsibility for insuring system reliability and to prevent misuse of identifiable personal data is that of the organization
which creates, maintains, uses or disseminates the records.0
It must be noted that the Advisory Committee wisely distinguished
between two types of automated data systems: personal data systems
and statistical-reporting and research data systems. Obviously the
former, essentially a computer-accessible collection of records containing personal data that can be associated with identifiable individuals,
must be subject to more stringent controls to preclude abuse of individual privacy than systems designed to provide information in gross
to be utilized in conjunction with the administration and evaluation
of either public or private programs and services. The report rightly
concludes that the latter, administrative record-keeping operations
seldom keyed to identifiable individuals, ". . . can and do constitute
rich sources of statistical . . . data useful for many purposes," 7 citing
by way of example, the use of IRS records as the data source for the
quinquennial Census of Business and Manufacturers or of hospital
records to develop data banks on particular diseases or disabilities.
5. COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 8, 1975, at 1, col. 2-3.
6. ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA Sys., REPORT ON RECORDS COMPUTERS
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 48-75 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].

7.

Id. at 82.
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The report can be criticized in two particulars which merit further
consideration and debate.
In the first instance the Advisory Committee strongly opposes the
use either of individual Social Security numbers or evolving any other
standard universal identifier (SUI). The advantage of some form of
SUI is essentially practical: duplication and error in automated recordkeeping may be substantially reduced, thus benefitting the individual
whose data is on file, and, ultimately more significant, facilitating the
interchange of data between various automated systems. In fact in
most European countries SUIs have been in use for at least a decade.
The Advisory Committee concedes the significance of establishing
an SUI, stating that they ".
SUI in the abstract . . . .

.
,"

. are not opposed to the concept of an
but concludes, erroneously in this re-

viewer's judgment, that the dangers in use of an SUI outweigh any
practical benefits." Indeed, if the previously mentioned principles are
implemented, the dangers inherent in the use of an SUI would in
large measure be eliminated. To await some future event-at a time
when increasing effort is being given to the implementation of a more
sophisticated, economical and efficient means of transferring funds,9
to cite but one example-is no more than contemporary Ludditism.
The ANS X3 Committee, established by the American National
Standards Institute to consider a standard identification of individuals
for information interchange, in 1971 addressed the social implications
of an SUI. That study concluded that adequate legal and operating
controls could be implemented to protect individual privacy in data
interchange while simultaneously permitting the use of an SUL. In an
extensive series of articles on the Advisory Committee's report, the
editors of Computerworld marshalled the social benefits to be derived
from data interchange based upon an SUI.lO Summarized, the ANS X3
Committee's favorable conclusion on the issue of an SUI was premised
upon (1) individual data file interchange now being legally permissible
and socially acceptable; (2) data systems, to insure a high degree of
8. Id. at 112.
9. See, e.g., research respecting installation of point-of-sale terminal systems for
electronic credit card transactions, AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 13, 1973, at 1, col. 2-4; electronic interchange of bank credit card sales drafts, AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 29, 1973, at I,
col. 3-4; experimental implementation in several regions of the United States of electronic
funds transfer systems, AMERICAN BANKER, Jul. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 1-3, which are intended
to resolve the problem of some 29 million checks a day being circulated through the
banking system; J. Clarke, Mechanized Check Collection, 77 BANKING L.J. 449 (1960) and
Automation-The Banks' Legal Problems, 87 BANKING L.J. 99 (1970).
10. COMPuTERWOkLD, Aug. 8, 1973, at 8, col. 4.
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reliability and accuracy, requiring comparative source information
from other record-keeping systems, whether manual or automated; (3)
insuring accuracy in data system processing and reporting thus avoiding
the potentially serious consequences of misidentification of an individual; and (4) providing a means to permit open-ended growth of data
systems and thus permitting existing systems to handle greater volumes
at relatively lower costs.
The second major issue posed by the Advisory Committee's report
places in sharp contrast the continuing, but beneficial tension between
social needs and individual rights. The report implies that a need
exists for standardized data Collection efforts in criminal data systems
operated by the several levels of government, federal, state and local."
For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation presently compiles
and maintains relatively sophisticated dossiers on individuals suspected
of being involved in organized crime. Similarly the LEAA is investing
in the creation of a national computerized criminal offender information file which is intended to serve various public agencies.
Clearly a need exists for systematic collection and correlation of
data of this nature to assist in the investigation and control of criminal
activity as well as to provide a means by which the courts and correctional institutions can make better informed judgments respecting
sentencing, control of recidivism, and confinement or parole. However, the report recommends that, for the present, funding of such
interfacing efforts be stopped, urging a further study of:
the necessity for various possible kinds of information (and
intelligence) systems to effective law enforcement; the most appropriate structure(s) for such systems (centralized, decentralized,
state controlled, law enforcement controlled, etc.); the kinds of
safeguards that can and should be built into such systems; the
relationship of the data bands developed under such systems to
other data banks;
and the proper forms for public regulation of
2
such systems.'
* . .

This reviewer suggests that the need for such a study indeed exists,
but concludes that that effort in evaluation ought not impede present
efforts to rationalize the collection of data throughout the multiple
jurisdictions in this country so as to permit more meaningful and
intelligent judgments about the disposition and effective rehabilita11.
12.

supra note 6, at 222-46.
Id. at 244.
REPORT,
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tion of individuals accused of crimes. Certainly society need not await
another study in order to achieve this valid social goal and the constitutional imperative to protect the rights of the individual accused
can now be met by application of one of the Advisory Committee's
own principles: any individual, subject of a personal data record-keeping system, must enjoy the absolute right to correct or amend the record
of identifiable information about him.
The Advisory Committee has rendered this nation an invaluable
service by articulating in this report its concerns. That task completed,
a more difficult task remains. The public and, more particularly the
members of the legal profession, must address the issues raised by the
Advisory Committee, resolving the ever-present conflict between societal benefits and individual rights, a conflict that has been aggravated
by the new technology of automated information systems. Ronald A.
May, chairman of the First National Conference on Automated Law
Research, stated in his opening remarks to the conference that:
. . . the bar has not accepted its responsibilities [having] moved
from hostility toward [the] new technology, to indifference . . .
to . . . empty enthusiasm.' 8

The ubiquitous computer is now a reality. We are obliged to see to its
proper use in serving us.
Andrew N. Farley*

CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE

STUDIES. Edited by Jerome Alan Cohen.t Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1972, Pp. x, 417. $15.00.
Jerome A. Cohen's China'sPractice of InternationalLaw: Some Case
Studies is an outstanding selection of ten studies on Chinese legal behavior in specific instances, published by Harvard University Press.
Professor Cohen, who chaired a panel on China at the annual convention of the American Society of International Law, has succeeded in
13. A.B.A. DEP'T OF STATE & LOCAL BAR SERV., COMPUTERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
1 (Special Issue No. 2, June, 1973).
0 B.A., Washington and Jefferson College, 1956; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh, 1961;
M.P.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1962. Member, Pennsylvania Bar Association Select
Committee on Law and Technology.
t

Professor and Director of East Asian Studies, Harvard University.
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bringing together a group of legal experts who examine from different
points of view the behavior of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
based on actual cases beginning with the Communist takeover of all of
China.
Professor Cohen was instrumental in starting legal research at Harvard Law School into China's attitudes, and is now Director of the
Law School's East Asian Legal Studies. He has assembled a group of
scholars, versed in the subject, who are keen observers and frequently
participate in the actual events. It is a great merit of the book that the
authors engaged in a sophisticated investigation of all the available
and published records in an attempt to extract a definite pattern of the
attitude of the PRC. However, since a great deal of the information,
particularly in the Western countries, is still not available, there is a
certain tendency to give more weight to the Chinese position, particularly so, since the collection of documents relating to foreign relations is readily available to Chinese-speaking scholars. In some cases
this might lead to a tendency to be tolerant towards China's attitude
to international law.
The problem of the acceptance of the norms of international law
by new revolutionary states has always been considerable. In its early
days, the United States government promoted, on the basis of ideology,
the establishment of Republics in Europe. The Napoleonic government exported its domestic systems by force, in disregard of previous
rules, over all of Europe. The Russian Revolutionary government for a
long time refused to recognize previous commitments by the Czarist
government.
The new revolutionary Chinese government under Sun-Yat-Sen, and
later under Chiang Kai-Shek, attempted to revise or modify unequal
treaties. The new People's Republic of China initially was less willing
to accept even the minimum rules previously more, or less condoned
by the Soviet Union.
Philippe Ardant, in an article on Chinese Diplomatic Practice,
clearly states that the PRO expected two standards for diplomatic relations-the most elementary and the oldest area of international law.
Chinese diplomats enjoyed all the rights of other diplomats in Western
countries such as France, the Netherlands or Great Britain, but all
diplomats in China were subject to standards set and approved by the
Chinese government. The Chinese assumed that they could develop
their own rules and make the reality in China conform to the ideo-
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logical needs and the interests of the revolution in China, irrespective
of reciprocity.
The Foreign states and their representatives in Chinese territories
must not expect to be esteemed and humored simply because they
are foreigners; rather, they will be treated according to the objective attitudes towards revolution and this revolution is taking
place every day the Chinese live it.1
On the basis of this attitude, it seems difficult to explain consistency on
the part of Chinese behavior, even taking into account the constant
shift in internal policy.
The book is divided into eight areas; recognition, establishment of
diplomatic relations and immunities, diplomatic practice, non-recognition and trade from the first section. The next essay in the book is
devoted to negotiation with China. Three articles are devoted to
disputes, one to the Soviet-Sino dialogue on territorial issues, one to
comparing views on unequal treaties by the PRC and Nationalist
China, and another to the conflict with India, concerning internment
of all Chinese Nationals.
The last two articles are treating Peking's relationship to international organizations and its relationship to the International Red
Cross. The selection of subjects shows a sophisticated approach to the
Chinese situation and an attempt to cover the situation from all points
of view.
The authors are similarly carefully selected. All but one are presently
university professors, some are of Chinese origin and others are veteran
observers of the Chinese scene. They all appear to share an admiration
of China and its culture, except perhaps for Philippe Ardant who takes
a more unemotional approach.
Professor James C. Hsiung of the Department of Politics, New York
University, divides his observations between an introductory analysis
of recognition, the first period of the PRC's struggle for recognition,
and the second period during which the PRC is in the forefront of
recognizing newly independent states formed between 1956 and the
present. The methods used for recognition during the last period are
unorthodox, but can be explained. The attitude was largely based on
the PRC's struggle to be "the sole legitimate government of China,"
1. Ardant, Chinese Diplomatic Practice During the Cultural Revolution, in CHINA'S
PRACncE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 127 (J. Cohen ed. 1972).

2.

Hsiung, China's Recognition Practice and its Implications in International Law, in
(J. Cohen ed. 1972).

CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 40
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and also to be in touch with revolutionary movements such as the
Algerian provisional government and other units attempting to form a
state. This pragmatic approach is probably exaggerated by the author
who attributes this action to "cultural and ideological backgrounds
totally different from the 'older' Western states."3 While this difference obviously exists, it is also true that India, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Egypt, Japan, Nigeria and practically all of the African states, have
acted in foreign policy along the lines of the norms of international
law, with any deviations being more or less within the limits of the
European system during the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. It would
seem less the cultural, religious or ideological differences which have
lead to the denial of the accepted rules of international law than the
expression of revolutionary elan and the desire to bring about change
in the status quo by Napoleon's France, the Soviet Union, Castro's Cuba
and the PRC.
The author rightly considers this revolutionary attitude in recognition as a "serious challenge to the original European-defined value
system and the international law derived from it."' 4 It might also be

considered a return to a more elementary stage of the development of
intercourse between states. Professor Hsiung's analysis shows that
recognition de ideologica was practiced by the PRC following the
footsteps of Soviet attitudes "during the 1920's when they recognized
the warlord government in Peking (de jure), the Kuomintang opposition in Canton (de facto) and the nascent Communist movement in
China (de ideologica)." 5 Similarly the Chinese government employed
different methods by using the five principles with communists and
"anti-imperialists and anticolonial" states, a second form with Western
countries replacing Nationalist China and a third one with smaller or
less important states, skipping all mention of principles.
Professor Ko Swan Sik, professor of the Inter-University Institute of
International Law, in a learned discussion of the Dutch experience
with China, comes to the conclusion that "a number of acts on the part
of the Chinese could be characterized as violations of the traditional
rules."16 Some of the acts have been motivated by non-legal considera3. Id. at 19.
4. id.
5. Id. at 53.
6. Sik, The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Scope of Diplomatic Immunity: The Dutch Experience with China, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
SOME CASE STUDIES 84 (1. Cohen ed. 1972).
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tions, although, in Professor Sik's conclusion, violations of inter7
national law are "not exceptional in the practice of states."
Professor Philippe Ardant, who, as a French diplomat, was an observer in China, in his analysis of Chinese diplomatic practice, expands
the views previously expressed. He clearly states that Chinese behavior
is "difficult to understand in terms of norms and customs currently accepted in international society."18 Offensive episodes and the permanence of provocative behavior denote an obvious unwillingness to bend
to the rules of diplomatic life. The Chinese attitude is "a strategy
based on a coherent, original conception" of diplomatic relations,
dictated by the actual state of international society. In the Chinese
opinion it is the only correct model and is "intended as a substitute
for the diplomatic rules consecrated by the Convention of Vienna of
196l."9 It is, as Ardant concludes, behavior in the interest of the revolution in the contemporary world. The Chinese policy is strengthened
by most embassies which have never taken any collective action, even
after the most marked attacks on customary diplomatic practice. It
seems that foreign states do not wish to run afoul of the Chinese and
"that they accept from them what they would never suffer in their
relations with one another." 10
Professor George Ginsburgs and Professor Carl Pinkele dissect the
territorial issue between the Soviet Union and China, and come to
the conclusion that it did not "contribute a significant dimension to
the Sino-Soviet controversy."" Professor Hungdah Ciu of Taiwan's
National Chengchi University, finds that unequal treaties are opposed
by both the Chinas. However, the PRC declares these treaties invalid
while Nationalist China considers revision, or abrogation necessary,
under the principle of rebus sic stantibus.
Professors Jerome Alan Cohen and Shao-Chuan Leng, in their
article on the Sino-Indian dispute over internment and detention of
Chinese in India, confirm the previously reported attitude that China
desires application by India of the rule of law-even an extension of
it by including Indian nationals of Chinese extraction-but is un7.
8.

Id.
Ardant, Chinese Diplomatic Practice During the Cultural Revolution, in CHINA'S

PRAcTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: SOME CASE STUDIES 86

(J.

Cohen ed. 1972).

9. Id. at 87.
10. Id. at 128.
11. Ginsburgs & Pinkele, The Genesis of the Territorial Issue in the Sino-Soviet Dialogue: Substantive Dispute or Ideological Pas de Deux?, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES
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willing to grant access by the International Committee of the Red
Cross to prisoners in China. China's efforts to adopt two standards, one
for India and one for its own behavior, is characterized by the authors
as a case of a new approach in international law: The Chinese Communist elite adopted a "do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do" approach to international law.
Of the last two essays concerning China's attitude towards international organization, the first one by Professor Byron Weng on Peking's
participation in International Organizations, has been overtaken by
events. Communist China's replacement of the nationalist government
in the United Nations in 1971 and the joining of many specialized
agencies, create a new situation. Before the resolution giving PRC representation in the United Nations, China asked for substantial revision of the Charter and freeing of the United Nations from "the control of the United States and other big powers.'1 2 In 1971, the PRC
settled for the expulsion of Nationalist China and receipt by the PRC
of all rights given previously to China as a founding member.
The final essay by G.I.A.D. Draper of the University of Essex is an
indepth study of the PRC and the International Red Cross. It indicates similar behavior on the part of the PRC as is found in previous
essays. Between 1952 and 1966 the PRC consistently insisted on the
expulsion of Nationalist China and full recognition of itself as sole
representative of China. Its delegates, despite the good intentions of
the conference, refused to accept the impartiality and neutrality of the
International Red Cross and continued to attack the good faith of the
officers of the organization. The PRC finally stopped attending Red
Cross conferences when Nationalist China was seated at the New Delhi
conference in 1957.
Jerome Alan Cohen's book is a must for all students of international
law and of China. Despite the long opposition of the United States to
the PRC, American scholars painfully collected documents for an
indepth study of contemporary China. While most of the authors show
sympathy with China, they clearly describe, often critically, China's
behavior, its strengths and its weaknesses. All deplore the lack of respect for the general rules of international law at one time or the other,
but they try to explain it in relation to China's past history, its isolation and its self-reliance as a revolutionary Asian power. It might be
12. Weng, Some Conditions of Peking's Participation in International Organizations,
in CHINAS$PRACTCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIEs 341 (J. Cohen ed. 1972).
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argued that collective action by diplomats in China and foreign offices
would have helped the PRC to see the wisdom of accepting minimum
standards of international behavior within their boundaries. An article
by an Indian or Soviet international lawyer would probably have provided a further insight into the problem and have helped to assay the
situation from all sides.
The analysis contained in the book ends, despite some updating by
the authors, with the beginning of the PRC's participation in the international community in September, 1971. At that time the PRC became a member of the Security Council and was recognized by the most
important nations. China may now be entering a new stage of development and be on the way to creating a new approach based on adaptation to international behavior.
Until now, however, the keynote to China's behavior as developed
in this outstanding book, is the observation by Jerome Alan Cohen
that "any government strong enough to rule the China mainland will
be ardently nationalistic for some time to come and unwilling to promote world order on other people's terms." 18
Franz B. Gross*

DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL.

By Franklin E. Zimringt.and Gordon J. Hawkins.tt Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 376.

$13.50.
At the beginning of every criminal law course it is a convention to
make reference to the purposes of criminal law before we get on with
the important job of memorizing rules. These purposes are, compendiously, retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. To
the philosophically minded these ends justify, indeed sanctify, the
erection of the complex division of labor (policemen, judges, lawyers,
probation officers, and assorted payrollers) that is known in some circles
as the criminal justice system. But if one peeks behind the ritual
13. Id. at 342.
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invocation of this conceptual boiler plate, it is quickly apparent that
these are empty names, terms dangling in the airy empyrean of speculative thought. There is one exception to these strictures. The concept
of retribution seems to have been thought through at one time by a
certain Kant. The great merit of retribution as a theory is that it has
no pretense to be other than speculative, i.e., it does not depend for
its validity upon the truth or falsity of matters of fact. The justification for punishment is thus imposed on the world of cause and effect
and is independent of such data. One accepts or rejects the Kantian
theory because of the value system it presupposes. The other theories,
however, stand or fall on their power to predict and control behavior
in the real world--does punishment P attached to crime type X have
a measurable effect on type X criminal behavior in the large? Did
punishment P imposed on criminal C have an effect on his future behavior in the desired direction? Did the benefits of incarcerating
criminal C in view of the probability of a free C committing criminal
acts outweigh the costs of such confinement? The hooker is, of course,
that such questions have remained unasked or unanswered, thus rendering claims to sanction based on deterrence indices of the invoker's
allegiance to pseudo-scientific rhetoric, over, all competing forms of
hokum.
The point of the book under review is to marshall the assets of the
bankrupt, one Deterrence, not for the purpose of winding up its
affairs but for the purpose of promoting its reorganization so that it
can serve as a conduit for cash flowing from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Association people to your friendly neighborhood law and
society researchers. Thus, the only pretense the joint authors make to
originality is confined to making sense of current theories and suggesting promising, middle range research alternatives for the armies of
graduate fellows presumably stumped for a usable thesis topic.
The first 30 pages of the book make the point that deterrence theory
(like nearly every other aspect of the criminal justice system) is polarized along ideological, absolutist lines. The two opposites in the instant
case are: (I) the true believers in the universal efficacy of deterrence
regardless of type of actor, crime or social context; and (2) the skeptics
who truly believe that deterrence is a myth regardless of type of actor,
crime, or social context. If I may be allowed an aside, it is my hypothesis that such charicatures as presented above have little explanatory power in predicting the actual expectations or practices of
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the participants in the real world They seem the straw men that are
the stuff of law professors' dreams. At any rate, the strategic value of
these constructs is that they allow the authors to set up themselves as
moderates (the American public rejects extremists) who favor empirical research.
Our empiricists reject any attempt to give a theoretical grounding
for their exclusive focus on criminal law as opposed to other systems of
social control. This excludes from inquiry such troublesome practical
problems as the deterrent effect of civil commitment of drug addicts,
civil proceedings where penalties or punitive damages are authorized,
and injunctive remedies. (I pass over without mentioning the deterrence rationale for the entrapment defense and for such exclusionary
rules as Miranda v. Arizona.') The parochial focus on contemporary
American practices, in addition to putting the validity of such narrowly
researched findings on deterrence into serious question,2 results in a
failure to consider alternative practices as measures of security or comrades' courts. Surely if society has a moral duty to "test the effectiveness
of the policies pursued in light of available information and also to
search for further information,"' the scholar's responsibility to give a
tenable theoretical justification for failing to canvass other domestic.
and foreign sanctioning systems for policy-relevant information can be
4
no less.
Chapter Two, titled The Rationale of Deterrence, is divided into
sections dealing with the official ideology and ethical, economic, and
political aspects of deterrence. In the section on ethics, the authors
make hash of the Kantian position by reinterpreting Kant as a due
process liberal or, in the alternative, a utilitarian. This Procrustean
treatment is both unnecessary and offensive. It should be sufficient to
say that Kant's position, like so many other philosophical claims, has
1.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2.

See, e.g., L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW (1972).

3. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DETERRENCE].
4. This omission is an especially troubling one in view of the powerful theoretical
arguments in favor of a wider focus made some years ago in R. ARENS & H. LAssWELL,
IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER (1961). For example, it will not do to say, with Holmes, that
the state may adopt a frankly manipulative approach in criminal law because the state
does it in so many other spheres of activity, e.g., military conscription and taxation.
Such an argument leads to the inference that it is necessary to study all authoritative
deprivations as of a piece. This broadens the focus from the criminal law in isolation to
the criminal law as the extreme on a continuum involving the proper relations of the
individual to state power. As Allen has it, "We are concerned here with the perennial
issue of political authority. Under what circumstances is the state justified in bringing
its force to bear on the individual human being?" F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 36 (1964).
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never been refuted; it has been discarded as irrelevant to another age
and society. 5 We should be careful about subjecting philosophical
positions to the same twisting and bending that we find so useful in
manipulating precedents. I must also remark that the authors' effort to
ground policies concerning the limits of retribution by the standard
of allowing the state to do whatever does not "grossly exceed the community's normal expectation" 6 seems stunning, given recent Western
experience with totalitarian regimes of the Hitler-Stalin stripe. When
the authors descend from the clouds to discuss a mundane problem like
the exemplary sentence, however, the treatment is penetrating and
thought through.7 The sections on economic and political factors steer
clear of considerations which would force the authors to deal with
any broad, systematic set of inquiries about the criminal law as a
8
sanctioning system.
Chapter Three, appropriately entitled Definition, contains a definition of deterrence and a discussion of some of the policies that deterrence may be thought to maximize (rational calculation of alternatives,
expression of social disapproval, building habitual obedience to, respect for, and conformity to the law). The definition stipulates that
deterrence is used in the authors' sense where there is a threat which
causes individuals who would have committed the threatened behavior to refrain from doing so.9 It seems to this reader that this
definition does no more than operationalize Austin's well-known com=,and theory of law so that its predictive power may be tested by a
mighty array of social science techniques. 10 There is no attempt to
discuss why this definition of deterrence is preferred over other definitions in accordance with such recognized scientific criteria as fruitfulness in generating alternative hypotheses, fit with existing theoretical
paradigms, or superiority in ordering existing data. This is not to say
5. Cf. I J. RANDALL, THE CAREER OF PHILOSOPHY 11 (1962).
6. DETERRENCE, supra note 2, at 42. One might also ask whether there is any principled reason for preferring the "grossly excessive" formulation to any conceivable alternative formulation, e.g., adopting the least coercive alternative that community expectations will tolerate.
7. Id. at 44-50.
8. "Economists have in fact begun to enter the field of crime and punishment; principally by way of superimposing economic theory . . . on data derived from this area."
Id. at 55. One might profitably contrast the authors' resistance to looking beyond the
criminal law with their University of Chicago Law School colleague's discussion of deterrence and the economic theory of remedies in R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
357-62 (1972).
9.

DETERRENCE, supra note 2, at 71.

10. Id. at 249-367. Although these are blueprints devised by the authors to be put into
effect by others.
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that this definition is not the most useful, only that it is assumed to be
without discussion of potential competitors. While on this tack one
can further question what warrants singling out deterrence for book
length attention as compared to, say, rehabilitation. That choice is
worth somewhat more reasoned elaboration than Professor Vorenberg's
pontifical assertion in the foreword that "deterring future misconduct
is probably the principal aim of criminal sanctions.""1 From a theoretical point of view, it would be interesting to explore the notion
that rehabilitation is simply the other side of the coin--deterrence involving the causal efficacy of threats for past noncompliance, rehabilitation involving the causal efficacy of promised rewards for future
compliance.
The proferred definition informs the 150 page Chapter Four which
discusses the marginal deterrent effect of: (1) variations in the audience's perception of the threat; (2) variations in the probability of
apprehension; and (3) variations in the severity of punishment imposed.
The existing research on deterrence is constantly being criticized by
the authors on the ground that it fails to distinguish between cause and
consequence. That is another way of saying that the current literature
fails to test out alternative rival hypotheses, thus producing results
which are inconclusive. The solution for this is not necessarily as the
authors seem to think, increasing the output of the tidy, domestic
research characteristic of contemporary British social science. The
underlying problem may be a variant of the classic lawyer's syndrome
described by Thomas Reed Powell-"If you think you can think of
something without thinking of the thing to which it is attached, then
you have what is called legal thinking." So, too, the, real failure of
research on deterrence may be in the adequacy of a theoretical paradigm which treats the deterrence hypothesis as if it were in utter
isolation from a broader theory of social control or legal behavior as
an aspect of social control. The authors frequently refer to the abstraction "social control" as an explanatory factor which accounts for the
inadequacy of past studies. They do not, however, take the inference
that a usable macrotheory is a condition precedent to the deployment
of a concept like deterrence. For example, the authors remark that the
11. DETERRENCE, supra note 2, at XI. But see J. CONRAD, CRIME AND ITS CORRECTION
60-62 (1967). To mention only one area of substantive crime, the most important function of inchoate crime under the Model Penal Code is not deterrence but incapacitation.
See generally Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 957 (1961).
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topic of group processes is "peripheral" to their concerns. So, in a
section in which we might expect discussion of the deterrability of organized crime, the gangster state or corporate criminal behavior, we
are treated to a warmed over summary of some of the literature on
juvenile gangs and conscientious objectors.12
Chapter Five consists of an appraisal, from the authors self-confessed
layman's point of view, of the various techniques of social research.
The elaborate attention to the methodological tools of the sociologist's
trade puts the authors' failure to deal with the logically prior problem
of the construction of a usable macrotheory in even bolder relief. This
reinforces my belief that law and social science courses should be conceived of as a curricular adjunct to the basic course on evidence. Absent
some commitment to the problem of constructing social theories, it
would seem most appropriate to treat social science information as one
of the many ways of presenting complicated factual questions in judicial, administrative or legislative arenas. Such placement would
formalize the subordinate role allotted to detached scientific inquiry by
books such as this.
Chapter Six, An Agenda for Research, suggests a number of interesting studies for others to do setting forth the following criteria for selection: (1) social importance; (2) social significance; (3) amenability to
study; and (4) significance for deterrent theory as a whole. Criterion
four emphasizes again the narrow conceptions of theory which vitiates
much of the book's argument. The first three criteria assume the
would-be researcher's willingness to adapt himself to the priorities of
public officials anxious to get an answer. While unhesitating identification with the demands of the government is unproblematic to our
professional sense, it is by no means uncontroversial among social
scientists. 18
The preferred modality of research advocated by Zimring and Hawkins is the field experiment. One example of the ethical and legal
problems raised by this research strategy is a study performed in San
Diego County Municipal Court on the effects of probation on drunk
arrestees. 14 Chronic drunks who were found guilty were randomly
assigned to probation with no treatment, probation with compulsory
12. It might also be interesting to ask whether one could operationalize the assumption that the existence of the crime of conspiracy deters the formation of such groups.
15. See Becker & Horowitz, Radical Politics and Sociological Research, 78 Am. J. Soc.
48-66 (1972).
14. Ditman, Crawford, Forgy, Moskowitz & MacAndres, A Controlled Experiment on
the Use of Court Probation for Drunk Arrests, 124 Ams. J. Psy. 160 (1967).
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clinical treatment, probation with compulsory attendance at Alcoholics
Anonymous. The first difficulty is the court's abandonment of the duty
of principled decision-making in sentencing by imposing a standard
fine and probation term on all chronic drunk arrestees for the purpose
of allowing the researchers to achieve uniformity in the sample. The
second difficulty concerns random allocation in the stringency of the
terms of probation. It will not do to argue that no arrestee was worse
off than he would have been had the court selected imprisonment
rather than probation as the appropriate punishment. The crucial
problem which field experiments of this sort raise is exactly the same
as is raised by any form of experimentation on human beings-the
presence or absence of informed consent. 15 One can make an argument
that the theorist is not obliged to engage in the task of clarifying the
relationship between the goals of scientific knowledge and the dignity
of the individual.' 6 Advocates of applied research like Zimring and
Hawkins can claim no such privilege.
If I may be allowed to resort to quotationism in summing up, there
are three main alternative investments of intellectual resources in the
knowledge business:
(a) to try to establish one proposition well, by studying or
writing a monograph in which special data created for the purpose
at hand are used to greatly increase the credibility of that proposition; (b) to make distinctions among phenomena in the area or
to create (or learn) schemes of analysis which may be of use to
others (or to oneself) in analyzing particular problems in the
future, which enterprise is called "theory" at the present time in

sociology; (c) to try to increase the credibility of a number of
propositions in the area by the use of whatever information comes
to hand, just enough so that it becomes clear that more resources
17
ought to be invested in the study of these propositions.
The Zimring-Hawkins performance at hand does not attempt (a), does
not succeed at (b), and does tolerably well at (c) in the last thirty pages
of a 370 page book with nearly one thousand footnotes. Given the
deservedly high reputation of these authors in previous work and the
obvious expenditure of scarce intellectual resources on this book, one
15.
16.

See generally J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION ON HUMAN BEINGS (1972).
See Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE L.J. 1086 (1972).

17.

Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS

191 (J. March ed. 1965).
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can only say, with Horace, montes parturentur, nascitur riduculus
mus.

18

This book ought to have been an aperitif, bitter, astringent, but a
necessary prelude to the empirical banquet to follow. What we get is a
cordial whose taste is vaguely familiar, curious, not altogether unpleasing but quite out of place-not unlike a drink of Grand Marnier in the
early afternoon.
Michael E. Libonati*
18. Mountains have rumbled in the throes of birth pangs, a lowly mouse is born
(unlike the authors DETERRENCE, supra note 2, at 5, I translate my Latin references for
the benefit of the illiterat).
* A.B., Georgetown University, 1964; LL.B., Yale University, 1967; LL.M. Yale University, 1969; Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University.
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